Loan modifications rise; many don't pare payments

WASHINGTON — Though lenders are boosting their attempts to curb record-high home foreclosures, fewer than half of loan modifications made at the end of last year actually reduced borrowers' payments by more than 10 percent, data released Friday show. --> -->
WASHINGTON — Though lenders are boosting their attempts to curb record-high home foreclosures, fewer than half of loan modifications made at the end of last year actually reduced borrowers' payments by more than 10 percent, data released Friday show.
The report, based on an analysis of nearly 35 million loans worth more than $6 trillion, was published by the federal Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision. It provides the most detailed and broad analysis to date of efforts to stem the foreclosure crisis, which President Barack Obama is trying to combat with a $75 billion plan to promote loan modifications.
The report helps explain why many loans are falling back into default after being modified. Many borrowers and consumer groups contend that the modifications offered by the lending industry aren't very generous, despite more than a year of public prodding from regulators.
For instance, nearly one in four loan modifications in the fourth quarter actually resulted in increased monthly payments. That situation can happen when lenders add fees or past-due interest to a loan and spread those payments out over the 30- or 40-year period.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the report found that loans were far less likely to fall back into default if a borrower's monthly payment is reduced by a healthy amount.
Nine months after modification, about 26 percent of loans in which payments had dropped by 10 percent or more had fallen back into default. That compares with about half of loans in which the payment was unchanged or increased.
"This new data shows that, in the current stressful environment, modification strategies that result in unchanged or increased mortgage payments run the risk of unacceptably high re-default rates," Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan said in a statement.
But regulators said they saw a positive trend in the data, collected from mortgage companies including Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc.
Traditionally, lenders have seen loan workouts as a way to get a borrower back on track after a temporary disruption in income. Now, with the economy sinking fast and foreclosures soaring, they are increasingly coming around to the idea to that more permanent changes are needed.
Among loan modifications made in the October-December quarter, about 37 percent resulted in a drop in payments of more than 10 percent, compared with about one-fourth in the first nine months of the year. Regulators saw that growth as a positive sign.
"The trend toward lowering payments to make home mortgages more affordable is moving in the right direction," John Bowman, acting director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, said in a prepared statement.
The Obama administration is aiming to help up to 9 million borrowers stay in their homes through refinanced mortgages or modified loans. Still, the faltering economy, driven down by the collapse of the housing bubble, is causing the housing crisis to spread.
Among the loans surveyed in the report, just over 10 percent were delinquent or in foreclosure, compared with 7 percent at the end of September, the report said. Delinquencies are increasing the most among prime loans made to borrowers with strong credit, it said.
A broader study of the mortgage market last month found a higher percentage of problem loans.
The Mortgage Bankers Association reported that nearly 12 percent of all Americans with a mortgage — a record 5.4 million homeowners — were at least one month late or in foreclosure at the end of last year. That's up from 10 percent at the end of the third quarter, and from 8 percent at the end of 2007.
The trade group's study includes more than 45 million loans, 10 million more than the government report.

FDIC lays out broad home loan modification plan

By Karey Wutkowski

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The federal agency that insures most U.S. bank deposits unveiled a plan to prevent about 1.5 million home mortgage foreclosures by promising to share any losses with mortgage companies that agree to refinance certain home loans.

The agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp, said on Friday the plan would cost the government about $24.4 billion, which could be paid from the U.S. Treasury's $700 billion bailout program for the financial industry.

So far, most of the money in the bailout program, the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, has been injected as capital into banks.

FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair, who spent weeks unsuccessfully lobbying Bush administration officials for the foreclosure prevention plan, unveiled her agency's proposal two days after Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson dismissed the idea of the government underwriting failing home loans.

Paulson told reporters on Wednesday, "That (foreclosure plan) is a subsidy, or spending, program. The TARP was investment, not spending."

The FDIC pushed forward with its plan, posting it on its website Friday morning (http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/loans/loanmod/index.html).

"Although foreclosures are costly to lenders, borrowers and communities, the pace of loan modifications continues to be extremely slow," the FDIC said. "It is imperative to provide incentives to achieve a sufficient scale in loan modifications to stem the reductions in housing prices and rising foreclosures."

The FDIC said its plan would modify about 2.2 million mortgage loans by offering financial incentives to mortgage servicers. It would pay servicers $1,000 to cover expenses for each loan modified to the required standards, and would promise to share up to 50 percent of losses incurred if a modified loan defaults.

Eligible borrowers would include those who have missed at least two monthly payments on loans for homes they live in. Servicers would be expected to lower those borrowers' monthly payments to about 31 percent of the borrowers' monthly income.

The Treasury Department said on Friday that it was aggressively looking at ways to reduce skyrocketing home foreclosures under the TARP.

"We continue to aggressively examine strategies to mitigate foreclosures and maximize loan modifications, which are a key part of working through the necessary housing correction and maintaining the strength of our communities," Treasury Interim Assistant Secretary Neel Kashkari said in testimony prepared for delivery to a U.S. House of Representatives committee.

10 Things to Understand About the Housing Bubble

I came across the article while doing some research today and thought it was very good. Below is the beginning. The rest can be found here.

In Westwood’s view, the following ten factors most significantly contributed to the housing bubble and mortgage crisis:

1. Residential mortgage and consumer credit more than doubled in the first six years of this decade. From the founding of the nation through 1999, our citizens amassed some $5.1 trillion of home mortgage debt and $1.4 trillion of installment and credit card debt. By the end of 2006, these numbers stood at outstanding amounts of $11.0 trillion and $2.4 trillion, respectively. In total, American individuals became indebted by an additional $6.9 trillion in six short years (the bulk of which was in the three-year period from 2004 through 2006) more than doubling the debt outstanding at the beginning of the decade. Apologists often cite increases in wealth and in home equity value as offsetting this unprecedented and crippling increase in our citizens’ indebtedness. But the truth is we live in a nation with one of the lowest savings rates in the world (it was actually negative in 2005 and was likely negative in the year just ended) and, as detailed below, a significant portion of the perceived growth in home values has been specious at best.
2. Cheap mortgage loans offered on lax lending terms were responsible for much of the ballooning of home prices. Let’s say that in 2000, you had $100,000 to put down on the purchase of a home. In the same year, with residential mortgage rates at 6% for adjustable rate mortgages, you were offered a mortgage for 80% of the purchase price of the home you were seeking to buy. The $100,000 you had available meant that you could afford a $500,000 home (80% of $500,000 = $400,000 in mortgage) and, interest only, your monthly payment would have been approximately $2,000 per month. Now, zoom ahead to 2006. With the same $100,000 in your pocket, and an adjustable teaser interest rate of 3%, mortgage companies nationwide were knocking down your door offering you mortgages at 90% of your purchase price (and more – often over 95% in some cases). With your same $100,000 and for the same $2,000 per month interest payment – voila – you could now afford to pay $1,000,000 for the same house for which you would have been able to pay $500,000 six years before. And of course, that is pretty close to what happened during this period – residential home prices increased by over 74% from 2000 through 2006. Does that mean the homes themselves were actually worth more? Of course not.
3. The growth in home prices during the first six years of this decade has been unprecedented and should have had our mortgage bankers, investment bankers, regulators and the Fed raising at least an eyebrow or two. As prices more than doubled in some markets and increased over 74% nationwide from 2000 through their peak in 2006, the stewards of our banking sector and their overseers in government apparently neglected to consider why. Pointing to “global reserves of excess savings” and “more efficient capital markets” as the new paradigms rendering previous market fundamentals obsolete, the best and the brightest ignored the fact that debt driven home prices had totally disconnected from median household income which has increased by a mere 15% during the same period, before adjusting for inflation (median income actually decreased after adjusting for inflation). If there had been a global glut of savings, we would have experienced a boom in the production of all capital goods – not just limited to housing – which would be fully sustainable by those real savings (in contrast to what was actually a debt driven spate of asset inflation in housing). More importantly, the purchase price of homes actually rendered it more expensive, even on an after-tax basis, to own rather than rent a residence – in some markets by more than 30%. This phenomenon is not only historically unprecedented, but any student of finance and economics can tell you that it is as unsustainable as any market that is based on pure speculation. And pure speculation is what ultimately developed in residential real estate market – the notion of ever rising value, so similar to the dot com boom.
4. Mortgage lenders, seeking to maximize lending, relied on aggressive appraisals to justify outsized loans – and appraisers cooperated by ignoring their own established methodologies. The Chicago-based Appraisal Institute, the gold standard in real estate appraisals with 22,000 members, maintains guidelines known as the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP). Among other requirements, the USPAP directs, generally, that appraisers consider multiple indicia of the value of any form of property being appraised, with value defined as the most probable price at which a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to transact a fair sale, assuming (among other things) that “both parties are well informed, or well advised” and “the price [is] unaffected by special or creative financing…..granted by anyone associated with the sale.” In addition to considering recent sales of real estate, generally, Appraisers are regularly required to consider the value of properties based on the income they would produce if rented and based on the cost of replacing any improvements (buildings) to the property. They are then required to reconcile any differences among these three classic valuation methods. As it turns out, however, during the housing bubble, home prices completely disconnected from both rental values and from replacement costs. From 1960 through 1996, the ratio of average home rents to average home prices hovered in a band of 5% to 6% per annum. From 1996 to 2000, it declined to 4.6% and then, in a stunning drop this decade, the ratio fell to 3.5% by the end of 2006. Although common wisdom may have it otherwise, the fact is that construction costs barely moved at all during this decade, on an inflation adjusted basis, while home prices increased by 74%. If construction costs were constant and home prices ballooned, the only explanation – according to established valuation methodologies – could be that land was very suddenly worth dramatically more. But that much more, and that quickly? Appraisers couldn’t possibly reconcile these dramatically divergent indications of fair market value, so what did they do? Well, as it turns out – Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and pretty much all other mortgage originators, guarantors and investors, don’t consider income value as relevant to the appraisal of non-rental, residential real estate. Instead, appraisers merely conclude that recent sales are, for all intents and purposes, the only valid indication of fair market value. In doing so they enabled the entire market to ignore the impact of comparisons to rental properties and “special and creative” financing that – although it didn’t come from sellers – was demonstrably, and has now proven to be, uneconomic.

http://www.rgemonitor.com/us-monitor/253126/10_things_to_understand_about_the_housing_bubble_and_the_debt_crisis